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.N THE SUPREME COURT
JF THE STATE OF UTAH
,y~~STERN

CONTRACTING
COHPORATION (Employer) and
EMPLOYERS l\lUTU AL LIABILrrY lNSURANCE COMPANY OF
Wl~CONSIN (Carrier),
Petitioners,

\

-vs.-

(

:NDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and LEO A. DAVIS
Respondents.

Case
No. 9970

'

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Petitioners, Western Contracting Corporation (employer) and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of "Tisconsin (carrier), appeal a decision of the re~pondent, Industrial Commission of Utah, granting to
respondent Leo A. Davis (employee) compensation for
permanent partial disability under the provisions of
Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
rhe Commission granted compensation for 100 weeks,
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the period prescribed by the statutory schedule for total
loss of function of one eye. Petitioners question the
propriety of that award on the facts of this case.
DISPOSITION BELOW
After consideration of the facts and the law, the
respondent, Industrial Commission, awarded the respondent, Leo A. Davis, compensation of 100 weeks for
total blindness of one eye, in accordance with the statutory schedule in Section 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioners seek an order of this court declaring that
the Industrial Commission improperly assessed the disability under the statute by reason of the fact that said
Commission assessed the loss of visual function without
correction by glasses.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As indicated by the petitioners' brief, the facts are
stipulated. Respondent Leo A. Davis injured his right
eye in an industrial accident and the eye is essentially
blind without corrective optical lens. With such lens,
approximately 50% of the eye's function is restored.
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH STATUTE PROVIDES FOR COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF USE OF AN EYE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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WITHOUT REGARD rro 'VHETHER OR NOT
HUCil LOSS CAN BE Al\lELIOR.ATED BY
TH~~ USE OF EYEGLASSES.

A. THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE FOR
AWARDS IN THE UTAH WORKMEN'S
COllPENSATION ACT ll1UST BE FOLLOWED IN ALL CASES WITHOUT REOARD TO ARTIFICIAL APPLIANCES.

B. WHERE THE STATUTE DOES NOT
SPECIFICALLY MENTION GLASSES,
THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S POSITION
THAT THEIR EFFECT SHOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
COMPENSATION.

C. THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT IS TO PROVIDE
COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF OR
DAJ.L1GE TO .A BODY MEMBER AND
NOT SOLELY TO PROVIDE FOR LOSS
OF EARNING POWER.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH STATUTE PROVIDES FOR COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF USE OF AN EYE
WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER OR NOT
SUCH LOSS CAN BE A?\IELIORATED BY
THE USE OF EYEGLASSES.

A. THE STATUTORY SCHEDULE FOR
ATVA.RDS IN THE UTAH WORKMEN'S
COJ!PENSA.TION ACT MUST BE FOLLOlYED IN ALL CASES WITHOUT' REG.A.RD TO ARTIFICIAL APPLIANCES.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Almost every state, in its Workmen's Compensation
Act, provides a statutory schedule which requires compensation for certain periods of time in the case of loss
of a member of the body and depending upon which member is lost. The purpose of such a statutory schedule is
to make certain that an employee is compensated for loss
of a body member even though this loss does not affeet
the employee's earning capacity. The schedules evaluate the member lost and generally give the results of
such evaluation in terms of a specific number of weeks
during which payments are to be made. In other words,
since the loss of an arm at the elbow appeared to be
more significant than the loss of a great toe with the
metatarsal bone thereof, the Utah State Legislature
provided that weekly payments should be made for the
former for 180 weeks and for the latter for only 30
weeks. S~ction 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended. This fixed compensation is then tied into the
amount the employee was earning before the accident so
as to not put an unwarranted burden upon any specific
employer.
The compensation provided by the statutory schedule
is automatic. The Industrial Commission of the State of
Utah (hereinafter called the "Commission") does not
have authority to wait and see if the injured employee
gets. an artificial arm to replace the real one. It does
not inquire as to whether a plain hook or an expensive
artificial hand which opens and closes is obtained. The
schedule in the statute says that 180 weeks of payments
shall be made for an arm lost at the elbow, and this is
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

what iR paid without regard to any appliance which the
employee may obtain to ameliorate the loss.
Similarly, in the case of a lost leg, the statute prorides that 180 weeks shall be paid where a leg is lost "at
or near the hip joint as to preclude the use of an artificial limb.'' "There ''the stump remains sufficient to permit the use of an artificial limb,'' the statute provides
for only 150 weeks of payments. It should be noted,
however, that the Commission is not authorized to wait
and see if such an artificial limb is in fact obtained, but
must require only 150 weeks of payments so long as the
use of such a limb is possible. This is true even though
such an artificial limb may be so uncomfortable on an
t.lmployee that he may have to stop wearing it. The
language about an artificial limb, then, does not say
that more compensation will be awarded if such a limb
is not obtained. It simply says that the greater amount
will be awarded if the use of such a limb is precluded
by the fact that the severance was so high. The only\
p11rpose of the artificial limb language is to show that
lfhere more of the leg is lost, the employee gets 'more
com.petJSation. The all'ard is based on. the extent of the
loss zeifhout consideration of appliances which may
ameliorate s·uch loss.

Applying the above reasoning to the eyes, it is
t)asy to see why awards should be based on loss before
~lasses are obtained. Again, the award is based on loss
of the member. Since the Legislature didn't make any

further breakdowns after loss by enucleation as distinguished from total blindness of an eye, it is clear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that its intent was to award 100 weeks whenever an
eye was blinded without enucleation.
The parties to this case have stipulated, and the
law in virtually all jurisdictions confirms, that an eye
in the condition of Mr. Davis' eye is "totally blind"
within the meaning of the statute. (§ 35-1-66.) As in
the case of the artificial arm or leg, the Commission is
not authorized to see what can be done with artificial
appliances to return some of the use of the injured
eye. There is no basis for the claim that the .use of the
body member should be evaluated after a helpful appliance is used in the case of an eye but before use of
such an appliance in all other cases. The Commission
must simply base the award on the fact of total
blindness.
B. WHERE THE STATUTE DOES NOT
SPECIFICALLY MENTION GLASSES,
THE 'fVEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S POSITION
THAT THEIR EFFECT SHOULD NOT
BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING
COMPENSATION.

Petitioners state that ''the view that visual impairment should be evaluated on a corrective basis is
the one taken by almost every court which has considered the problem.'' Petitioners' brief, page 4. Petitioners quote Schneider, The Law of lYorkmen's Compensation, Volume II, Second Edition, and 58 American Juris prudence 785 as supporting this position.
However, American Jurisprudence has conveniently
6
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t•itetl the only two state jurisdictions, New York and
~I i<·higan, which support its statement, and Schneider·~
~tatement was written in 1932, long before the great
bulk of the states had ruled on the question.
It is true that a few other states besides New York
and ~1 ichigan have said that glasses should be used
when determining loss of eyesight. However, in each
c.•usc.\ glasses u•cre required by the statute and nothing
was left to the courts. These states and their statutes
whieh require the use of glasses are as follows: Connecticut- General Statutes of Connecticut, 1958 revision, Section 31-307; Indiana- Burns Indiana Statutes
Annotated, § 40-1303; Maine - Revised Statutes of
Maine, c. 31, § 13; Rhode Island - Public Law, 1954, c.
:t!!)7, ..:\ rt. II, § 12 (a-d) ; and l\Iassachusetts - Annotated Laws of :Massachusetts, ch. 152, § 36.
~tates

which have statutes similar to the Utah statute, which do not require that glasses be used, have held,
almost without exception, that these appliances should not
be used in determining the loss suffered by the employee.
Some of these states, with cases so holding, are as follows: Colorado (Jewell Collieries Corp. v. Kenda, 110
Colo. 394, 134 P. 2d 206 [1943]); Delaware (Alessa;ndro
Petrillo Co. v. Jlat·ioni, 3 W. W. Harr. 99, 131 A. 164
[1926]); Idaho (J/ cDonald Y. State Treasurer, 52 Idaho
535, 16 P. 2d 988 [1933]) ; Kansas (McC1tllo1tgh v. Southlt'f:dtT·n Bell Tclephoue Company, 155 Kan. 629, 127 P.
~d 467 [ 1~)42] ; ~Iinnesota (Licingston v. St. Paul Hydraulic Hoist Compauy, 203 ~linn. 62, 279 N.W. 829
[ Ul~iS]); llissouri ( Graf Y • ...Vat ional 8 eal Products ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pany, 225 :Mo. App. 702, 38 S.W. 2d 518 [1935]; North
Carolina (Schum v. Catawba Upholstering Company, 214
N.C. 353, 199 S.E. 385 [1938]; Oklahoma (Parrott Jl!otor
Company v. Jolls, 168 Okl. 96, 31 P. 2d 925 [1925]; West
Virginia (Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boa.rd, 118 W. Va. 565, 191 S.E. 49 [1937]);
Nebraska ( Otoe Food Products Co. v. Cruickshank, 141
Neb. 298, 3 N.W. 2d 452 [1942]); and New Jersey (JohO!Yl!Jtson v. Union Iron Works, 97 N. J. Law 569, 117 A.
639 [1922].

It should be noted that the vast majority of these
cases which support the Commission's position were decided after 1932, the date in which Schneider's statement
quoted in petitioners' brief was written.
Most of the states not covered in the last two paragraphs have statutes worded similar to the Utah statute
but have no case law interpreting the same. The states
given, however, are sufficient to show that the great
weight of authority is contrary to petitioners' stated
r position.
The two above-mentioned states, the District
of Columbia, and an occasional federal court in dictum,
are the only authorities to the contrary.
The case of Otoe Food Products Co. v. Cruickshank,
supra, purports to rely on cases going both ways from
twenty-nine jurisdictions and, although the court's impression of the rule in various jurisdictions is often
erroneous, the court's ultimate conclusion has a good
deal of merit. The court stated:
"In an analysis of Section 48-121 Comp. St.
1929, we see nothing in the act indicating an intenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion on the part of the legislature that disability
after <·orrection should be the basis for awarding
t•ompensation, where there has been an eye injury.
• • • If the act is faulty, the correction should be
mnue by the legislature and not by the court.''
P. 4:>;J.

In reaching the conclusion that glasses should not
be used in determining the extent of injury, the Indiana
t~ourt in Shaw v. Rosenthal, 112 Ind. App. 468, 42 N.E.
2d 383 ( 1!)42), said that while the ''general purpose of\
the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act is to compensate for
t'unetional loss, nevertheless those parts of the act which
fix a definite amount of compensation for a specific
injury are arbitrary in nature and are based not on loss
of earning capacity but on actual physical loss.'' P. 384.
Th(' rourt ignored a reference to glasses in another section of the statute in making its award.
Petitioners have raised the question of the holding
in the case of Jloray v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah
404, HID P. 1023 (1921). It is true that the Utah Supr('me Court cited the Michigan and New York view
stated in r'linc v. Studebaker, 189 Mich. 514, 155 N.W.
;)19 (1915 ), but this was only for the purpose of supporting the Utah Industrial Commission's award based
on an injury to eyes and determined without correction
by ~lass~s. The Commission in .:.lloray, as in the instant
case, had awarded compensation based on complete
l()ss of one eye despite the fact that substantial vision
eould be gained by the use of glasses. The injured
employee appealed, contending that the award was too
small. In upholding the Industrial Commission's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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award, the court cited Cline to show that it would be easier to find that the award was too large than it was too
It should be noted that Cline was one of the
small.
1
Ifew cases on this point on the books in 1921. Thus,
I the Moray court had no other available authority and
could not yet see how the weight of authorities would
ultimately be lined up. Secondly, the Cline position
was simply stated to show the employee the absurdity
of his appeal. The actual holding of the Moray case
upheld the Industrial Commission's award which was
arrived at without the use of glasses.

I

Contrary to the dicta in Moray, the Kansas court
in McCullough v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 155
Kan. 629, 127 P. 2d 467 ( 1942) said :
''The cases bearing upon the question as to
whether compensation for injury to an eye should
be computed without or with the aid of corrective
lens are collected in 99 A.L.R. 1507, and in previous annotations and in the subsequent decisions.
Each of these annotations has noted a conflict in
the authorities, which it is said continues to exist.
l''rhis conflict for the most part results from dif\ ferences in the statute being considered. Some
''--statutes, it is said, make a specific provision with
regard to the question. Where the statute does
not specifically or indirectly require a holding that
the use of corrective lens must be taken into ac-count the great weight of authority is that the
compensation should be computed without the use
of such corrective lens. (Citations omitted.)
"It is conceded we have no statute in this state
which requires the commissioner or the court, in
considering the amount of compensation due for
an injury to an eye, to take into consideration the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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aid which might be furnished by corrective lens.
On the contrary our statute with respect to scheduled injuries has been uniformly construed as
being the sole guide to determine the amount of
compensation when the injury is once determined." (Citations omitted.) P. 470.

C. THE PURPOSE OF THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT IS TO PROVIDE
COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF OR
DA11l.AGE TO A BODY MEMBER AND
NOT SOLELY TO PROVIDE FOR LOSS
OF EARNING POWER.

Petitioners place a good deal of reliance in the case
of Hrashington Terminal Compan,y v. H oage, et al., 79
~,. 2d 158 (1935), from the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. The court held that the employee's injury should have been determined after corrertiotl from eyeglasses. This case is representative
of the state minority view of New York and :Michigan
in that it stresses the proposition that the intention of
the Workmen's Compensation Law is to provide compensation for loss or disability of earning power and
not indemnity or damages for injury to a member of
the body. It is submitted that this view of the purpose
of the \Yorkmen's Compensation Law is demonstrably in
error.

Samuel B. Horovitz, in his work entitled ''Current
Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation,'' published in :J[ay, August and November, 1947,
is~tws of The Law Sorietv Journal, Vol XII Nos 6 ,. .,
.
.
'
. ' '
and S, has an excellent chapter on the history and theory
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the Workmen's Compensation Acts.
Mr. Horovitz states :

On page 470,

''Unquestionably, compensation laws were enacted as a humanitarian measure to create a new
type of liability - liability without fault - to
make the industry that was responsible for the
injury bear a major part of the burdens resulting
therefrom. It was a revolt from the old common
law and the creation of a complete substitute
therefor, and not a mere improvement therein. It
meant to make liability dependent on a relationship to the job, in a liberal, humane fashion, with
litigation reduced to a minimum. It meant to cut
out the narrow common law methods of denying
awards.'' (Citations omitted.)
Horovitz continues on page 478 with a quote from
Mr. Justice Sutherland of the United States Supreme
Court, who wrote in 1932 :
''The modern development and growth of industry, with the consequent changes in the relations of employer and employee, have been so profound in character and degree as to take away, in
large measure, the applicability of the doctrine
upon which rests the common law liability of the
master for personal injury to a servant, leaving
of necessity a field of debatable ground where a
good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of
legislation, calculated to establish new bases of
liability more in harmony with these changed conditions.'' Cudahy Packing Company v. Parra...
more, 263 U. S. 418, 423, 44 S. Ct. 153 (1923).
Horovitz concludes that this new theory of compensation which now prevails in all but one state was "that
industry (and ultimately the consumer) should bear its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fnir share of the cost of injuries of workers without trying to place the blame on either party. The relation of
the injury to the job was to be the test, not the relation
of the injury to fault or blame or negligence.'' Page
479. It is clear from Horovitz's thorough analysis of~
the Workmen's Compensation Laws that their purpose
was in fact to provide compensation, indemnity or damages for injuries to a member of the body, rather than,
ns stated in the minority views, to provide compensation for loss of earning power as such.

/

Mr. Horovitz's theory is further substantiated by
the fact that, as pointed out in Point IA, infra, almost
all the states which have workmen's compensation laws
havP statutory schedules for the loss of various limbs
and members of the body, and that these statutory schedules are always followed in any given cases. For example, the Utah statute provides that compensation is to
be paid weekly for one hundred and forty weeks for the
loss of one leg between the knee and ankle. If the theory
of the Workmen's Compensation Law were to provide
compensation for loss or disability of earning power,
the Commission would have to decrease this award where
tlw injured person was a watchmaker. On the other
hand, it would appear that the award should be increased
where the person was a professional tennis player. Since
these adjustments cannot be made under our statute, nor
under the statutes of the vast majority of the other states,
it is obvious that the statutory purpose is not to compensate for loss of earning power. Rather, the thought
i~ that a monetary Yalue should be assigned to each memSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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her of the body and that this value should be paid to the
person regardless of whether there is an impairment of
earning power. It is submitted that the lV ashington Terminal, New York, and Michigan courts have misinterpreted the purpose and spirit of the acts.

CONCLUSION
The order of the Industrial Commission in this case
awarding compensation based on uncorrected loss of
visual function is in harmony with sound reasoning and
with the vast weight of authority from states with similar statutes, and should be affirmed by this court.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General
FREDERICK S. PRINCE, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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